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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE
POSTHUMOUS RETRIEVAL OF GAMETES
ABSTRACT
In the United States, federal and state laws on the issue of posthumous
retrieval of gametes are almost non-existent. As the field of medicine continues
to grow and more posthumous gamete retrieval procedures become viable, state
courts and hospitals are left on their own when patients and family members ask
their doctors to perform such procedures. As such, there exists wide variability
from hospital to hospital and state to state for a deeply personal and timesensitive procedure. By reviewing state court cases and hospital policies, this
article demonstrates the variability between practices and illustrates key
questions that arise when requests for these procedures are made. The purpose
of this article is to argue for an expansion of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA) which would explicitly allow posthumous gamete retrieval in instances
where the deceased donor gives express consent. The vast majority of states have
enacted anatomical gift statutes similar or identical to the UAGA. By expanding
the UAGA to explicitly include posthumous gamete retrieval procedures, the
United States can begin to create uniformity surrounding the practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 23, 2019, Peter Zhu, a twenty-one-year-old West Point cadet,
suffered an accident while skiing that severed his spinal cord. 1 Zhu was flown
to Westchester Medical Center in New York, where he was declared brain-dead
on February 27. 2 Since Zhu was a registered organ donor, the Westchester
Medical Center prepared his body for organ donation. 3 Zhu’s parents
subsequently filed a petition seeking an emergency court order “[d]irecting
Westchester Medical Center to retrieve sperm from [Zhu]” and to allow Zhu’s
parents to “use [Zhu’s] sperm for third party reproduction.” 4 Zhu’s parents
testified that although he was unmarried and left no directive for postmortem
sperm retrieval, Zhu had repeatedly expressed his intentions to have a family. 5
The New York Supreme Court found that Zhu’s presumed intent for use of his
genetic material could be “gleaned from certain of his prior actions and
statements” and concluded that Zhu’s parents were the proper parties to make
decisions regarding that genetic material. 6
As medical technology has advanced, so too have the methods for human
reproduction. One such avenue for posthumous reproduction involves the
posthumous retrieval of sperm or eggs (collectively known as “gametes”). 7
Posthumous retrieval of gametes is a procedure whereby a physician extracts
gametes from a recently deceased or brain-dead patient. 8 The purpose of
retrieving the gametes is to use them for conception of an embryo. 9 The untimely
death of a young person, as described above, is a common situation for the
posthumous retrieval of gametes. 10 However, Zhu’s situation is unique in that
his parents asked for the retrieval of his gametes. 11 In many cases, a deceased’s
spouse or fiance is the party that makes the request. 12 It is important to note that
1. In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d 775, 776 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Peter D. Kramer, Parents of Dead West Point Cadet Can Use His Sperm to Make Baby,
Judge Rules, USA TODAY (May 23, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2019/05/
23/west-point-cadet-peter-zhu-parents-can-use-his-sperm/1203763001/.
6. In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d at 775, 778.
7. Cynthia E. Fruchtman, New Life after Death - The Legal Landscape of Posthumous
Collection and Use of Gametes, SCITECH LAW., Summer 2016, at 12, 13.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Ethics Comm. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Posthumous Retrieval and Use of Gametes
or Embryos: An Ethics Committee Opinion, 110 FERTILITY & STERILITY 45, 46 (2019).
12. See Bethany Spielman, Pushing the Dead into the Next Reproductive Frontier: Post
Mortem Gamete Retrieval Under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 331,
334–35 (2009). See also Brief for Appellant at 9, Robertson v. Saadat, 262 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2020) (No. B292448).
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posthumous retrieval is different than a case in which a person donates his or her
gametes—for instance, to a sperm bank—then dies at a later date. The latter
situation brings with it many ethical and legal concerns that are beyond the reach
of this Article. This Article will focus only on cases in which a person’s gametes
are retrieved posthumously, like Zhu’s. Here, the term posthumously also
includes situations where the donor is brain-dead when the gametes are
retrieved.
Some of the controversy surrounding posthumous retrieval of gametes stems
from the lack of federal or state laws or regulations controlling the retrieval
process. 13 Instead, decisions regarding who may request the procedure, or even
whether the procedure will be performed, are left to hospitals and hospital
systems. 14 This gap in the law presents a problem because it means hospitals and
providers have next to no guidance on this issue, and the policies for posthumous
retrieval vary greatly from one hospital to the next. 15 Further, many hospitals do
not have any policies in place when a request for posthumous retrieval is made. 16
Because policies can vary widely across hospitals and health care systems, this
Article will argue for the implementation of a uniform act regulating the
posthumous retrieval of gametes.
Another major concern surrounding posthumous retrieval of gametes is the
ethical issue of consent. 17 In Zhu’s case, the court considered the fact that Zhu
left “no express direction” regarding the retrieval and use of his sperm. 18 The
donor’s consent is especially important in cases of posthumous retrieval,
because he or she will not be alive for the life of the potential child. When the
donor does not leave an advance directive for the use of his or her gametes,
hospitals and courts are left to infer consent from the surrounding
circumstances. 19 This could lead to a variety of ethical issues, most notably the
concern that the decedent only wanted to have children if he or she would be
alive to raise them. 20 Because the United States lacks a statute or regulation that
governs the use of gametes retrieved posthumously, hospitals have created
varying and contrasting policies to fill the void. 21 In order to protect the true
interest of the deceased, and in an effort to create uniformity across the states,

13. Andrew Joseph, ‘They Don’t Want His Story to End’: Efforts to Save the Sperm of the
Deceased Come with Heartache and Tough Questions, STAT NEWS (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/03/13/postmortem-sperm-retrieval/.
14. Id.
15. Nicholas J. Waler et al., Policy on Posthumous Sperm Retrieval: Survey of 75 Major
Academic Medical Centers, 113 UROLOGY 45, 47 (Mar. 2018).
16. Id. at 46.
17. Ethics Comm. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 11.
18. In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d 775, 778 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019).
19. Id.
20. Ethics Comm. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 11.
21. Waler et al., supra note 15, at 45.
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the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
should amend the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) to explicitly allow
posthumous gamete retrieval only when the deceased donor has given express
consent.
Part II of this Article describes the history and ethical concerns of
posthumous retrieval of gametes. Part III explores the recent legal history of
posthumous retrieval, as well as the UAGA. Finally, Part IV analyzes the
connection of posthumous retrieval to the UAGA and argues for the inclusion
of retrieval of gametes under the procedures set by the UAGA.
II. HISTORY OF POSTHUMOUS RETRIEVAL IN THE UNITED STATES
A.

Growth of Posthumous Retrieval

As medical science and technology advance, posthumous retrieval of
gametes becomes more common and more readily available. 22 Posthumous
retrieval of sperm, first performed in 1980, involves extracting sperm from a
recently deceased or brain-dead male. 23 The sperm is retrieved for the purpose
of conceiving a child with a woman, most often the deceased male’s wife or
fiancee. 24 By contrast, posthumous retrieval of gametes from a female is not yet
a common practice in the United States. 25 However, as medical technology
continues to advance, the practice may soon become a common method to
conceive a child. 26 Medical scholars believe that it may soon be possible to
stimulate the ovaries of a woman in a vegetative state and retrieve her eggs for
fertilization. 27 While the processes of retrieving male sperm and female eggs for
posthumous conception are different in terms of the nature of the procedure and
the commonality of requests for the procedures to be performed, this Article will
group both posthumous retrieval of sperm and posthumous retrieval of eggs into
the posthumous retrieval of gametes.
Since the first successful posthumous sperm retrieval procedure in 1980,
“requests for the procedure have been increasingly frequent and are expected to
grow with each media report of a baby’s birth following [posthumous gamete

22. See Katheryn D. Katz, Parenthood from the Grave: Protocols for Retrieving and Utilizing
Gametes from the Dead or Dying, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F., at 289, 295 (discussing the increasing
frequency of requests for posthumous gamete retrieval and the expectation that these requests will
continue to increase).
23. Devon D. Williams, Over My Dead Body: The Legal Nightmare and Medical Phenomenon
of Posthumous Conception Through Postmortem Sperm Retrieval, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 181, 181
(2011).
24. Id.
25. Katz, supra note 22, at 289.
26. Id. at 289–90.
27. Id. at 290.
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retrieval].” 28 While many requests come from the wife, fiancee, or girlfriend of
a deceased male, there have been cases, such as Zhu’s, where the parents of a
deceased male request the retrieval of their son’s sperm. 29 Although the
posthumous retrieval of gametes from a deceased female is not yet common,
there have been a small number of documented cases where a female’s eggs
have been retrieved postmortem. 30 It is reasonable to assume that once a
successful procedure is reported, requests for the procedure will grow rapidly,
as they did for posthumous retrieval of sperm. As such, hospitals and health care
providers must be ready to respond when such requests are made.
B.

Lack of Uniform Laws or Guidelines

Although the practice of posthumous gamete retrieval is becoming more
common, the United States lacks a set of laws or regulations which allow for,
limit, or even guide the practice. 31 The Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform
Parentage Act provide rights and restrictions for the practice of posthumous
reproduction, 32 but this Article will not discuss these uniform acts. The Uniform
Probate Code and the Uniform Parentage Act mainly focus on the rights of a
child born through posthumous reproduction, 33 an issue that extends beyond the
scope of this Article. Instead, this Article will solely focus on the practice of
posthumous retrieval of gametes and the lack of laws governing the procedure.
The void of law surrounding posthumous gamete retrieval is a problem in
the United States health care system because it requires hospitals and health care
systems to create their own policies when they receive the request for such a
procedure. 34 Only a small number of hospitals across the country have a policy
in place to respond to such a request. 35 Further, those policies differ greatly from
hospital to hospital, leaving no uniform method for handling a request for
posthumous gamete retrieval. 36
Waler and his coauthors conducted a survey of the top seventy-five major
academic medical centers in the United States “[t]o evaluate the presence and
content of policies on posthumous sperm retrieval.” 37 The authors argued that it
28. Id. at 295.
29. Id.; In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d 775, 776 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019). See also discussion infra
Section III.B (explaining Zhu’s parents’ petition for the retrieval of their deceased son’s sperm).
30. Yael Hashiloni-Dolv & Silke Schicktanz, A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Posthumous
Reproduction: The Significance of the Gender and Margins-of-Life Perspectives, 4 REPROD.
BIOMED. & SOC’Y ONLINE 21, 24 (2017).
31. Shelly Simana, Creating Life After Death: Should Posthumous Reproduction be Legally
Permissible Without the Deceased’s Prior Consent? 5 J.L. & BIOSCIS. 329, 333 (2018).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Waler et al., supra note 15, at 45.
35. Id. at 49.
36. Id. at 47.
37. Id. at 45.
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is beneficial for medical centers to put policies in place to prepare to respond to
requests for posthumous gamete retrieval:
Because of differences in attitudes toward [postmortem sperm retrieval] among
couples, coupled with the increase in [postmortem sperm retrieval] requests, it
may be useful for a practitioner faced with a [postmortem sperm retrieval]
request to have a policy for guidance as the window for [postmortem sperm
retrieval] can be as short as 36 hours. 38

However, the authors found that very few major academic medical centers have
established a policy for responding to such requests. 39
Out of the seventy-five institutions polled for the study, only forty-one
responded to the study, and only eleven of those academic medical centers had
established some sort of policy for posthumous sperm retrieval. 40 Further, there
was significant variation among those eleven established policies. 41 One
institution’s policy was simply that the practice of posthumous sperm retrieval
was not permitted. 42 The other ten policies permitted the practice but differed on
who could provide consent to the procedure, who could request the procedure,
and how long the bereavement period lasted after the donor’s death. 43 Many
institutions mandate a bereavement period—which may include a set time limit
before the gametes can be used and participation in grief counseling—to ensure
that the decision to use the gametes is not made solely because the requester is
grieving the loss of a loved one. 44 Four academic medical centers permitted the
procedure only if the donor produced prior written consent, while most other
medical centers allowed for the donor’s consent to be inferred by a surviving
spouse or through a court order. 45 Finally, eight of the ten academic medical
centers that allowed the procedure required that the donor’s surviving wife or
partner be the person to request that the procedure be performed. 46 Thus, in cases
like Zhu’s, the parents of a deceased or dying son could not request the
procedure. Without laws or regulations in place to guide hospitals and health
care systems, institutions have been left to respond to requests for posthumous
gamete retrieval on their own.

38. Id.
39. Waler et al., supra note 15, at 45.
40. Id. at 46–47.
41. Id. at 47.
42. Id. at 48 tbl.1.
43. Id. It is noteworthy that even among medical institutions that permit the procedure,
variances in the requirements and process exist. This demonstrates that the system currently in
place is far from uniform and can change drastically depending on the institution the donor visits.
See Waler et al., supra note 15, at 48 tbl.1.
44. Id. at 47.
45. Id. at 48 tbl.1.
46. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020] THE LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE POSTHUMOUS RETRIEVAL

189

In an attempt to guide the practice of posthumous gamete retrieval, the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has published an ethics
opinion detailing when posthumous retrieval may be ethically justifiable. 47 The
opinion outlines several possible interests of deceased individuals to be
considered before undergoing the procedure. 48 Of note, the ASRM considers
whether “a right to reproduce posthumously can be said to exist only if
posthumous reproduction implicates the same interests, values, and concerns
that reproduction ordinarily entails.” 49 These interests are important to evaluate
because an individual who wants to have a child during his or her lifetime may
not want to have a child if he or she is not alive to raise it. Although a person
may dream about becoming a parent, that dream for many individuals does not
stem from the desire to pass on his or her genes or family name. 50 For many, the
desire to become a parent arises from the significance of the experience of
raising a child. 51 “[T]he interest in not having children after one’s death is more
than an interest in avoiding certain experiences (such as rearing or worrying
about them). Rather, it is an interest, shared by many people, in avoiding having
children that one will not be able to raise and nurture.” 52 Finally, it is also
important to consider an individual’s desire to avoid bringing a child into the
world without either a mother or a father. 53 If either the deceased or his or her
spouse has expressed opposition to the conception of their child after one of their
deaths, then it would be unethical to ignore their wishes. 54
The ASRM argues that posthumous gamete retrieval is ethically justifiable
when written consent from the deceased authorizing the procedure is available. 55
An argument in favor of this conclusion is that it is difficult to know what the
deceased would have wanted without prior written consent. 56 “In some cases,
the only evidence of their wishes will be the testimony of a person bearing an
apparent conflict of interest, namely the one who wishes to use the deceased’s
sperm or eggs to reproduce.” 57 Written documentation of the deceased’s consent
requires the deceased to evaluate the previously mentioned interests prior to his
or her death. 58 To give written consent, the deceased should consider whether
47. Ethics Comm. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 11, at 45.
48. See id. at 46.
49. Id.
50. Menelaos Apostolou & Maria Hadjimarkou, Domains of Motivation in Men and Women
for Initiating and Terminating Procreation in an Evolutionary Perspective, 54 MARRIAGE & FAM.
REV. 486, 494–95 tbl.1 (2018).
51. Id.
52. Ethics Comm. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 11.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 45.
56. Id. at 48.
57. Ethics Comm. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 11, at 48.
58. See id. at 47.
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they would want their gametes to be used to conceive a child even after death.59
The deceased must consider whether they want another person, most likely their
spouse, to experience raising a child without them. 60 Finally, the deceased must
also consider whether that person wished to have a child knowing it will grow
up without a parent. 61
Like Waler and his colleagues, the ASRM encourages providers and health
care systems to develop policies to respond to requests for posthumous
retrieval. 62 However, the ASRM also notes that it may be ethical for providers
to refuse a request even if a policy exists permitting the procedure. 63 Because
the determination of whether the deceased would have given permission “cannot
be made with certainty in the absence of a written directive, it is reasonable to
conclude that physicians are not ethically obligated to comply with [a] request
from a surviving spouse or partner.” 64 Ultimately, this puts the decision to
proceed in the hands of an individual rather than a health care entity, or a state
or federal government. Therefore, a lack of laws or regulations on the issue could
cause great variety in outcomes for persons seeking the procedure.
Notably, the ASRM distinguishes between requests for posthumous retrieval
made by a surviving spouse or partner and those made by parents who survive
their child. 65 The ASRM considers it “troubling” when the request for
posthumous gamete retrieval is made by the parents of the deceased, and it
concludes that the situation is not ethically comparable to one in which the
surviving spouse or partner makes the request. 66 The ASRM recommends that
without direct written consent otherwise, entities that permit posthumous gamete
retrieval should decline all requests made by any person who is not a surviving
spouse or partner. 67
While not law, guidelines published by entities such as the ASRM are
important to consider when evaluating the legal and ethical case for posthumous
gamete retrieval. Especially considering the fact that no statutes or regulations
exist in the United States pertaining to posthumous gamete retrieval, individuals
seeking the procedure, as well as providers and health care entities evaluating
requests for the procedure, must look somewhere for guidance. Thus,
professional societies like the ASRM become vital in issuing guidance to health

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id.
Ethics Comm. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 11.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 48.
Ethics Comm. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 11, at 48.
Id.
Id. at 49.
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care providers and courts considering new, ethically and legally ambiguous
procedures. 68
III. POSTHUMOUS GAMETE RETRIEVAL IN THE COMMON LAW
In lieu of federal or state laws and regulations offering guidance on the
permissibility of posthumous gamete retrieval, providers and health care entities
are left to develop and establish their own policies. Instead of questioning the
legal and ethical nature of the practice, providers and health care entities often
require the individual seeking the procedure to obtain a court order acquiescing
to the procedure. 69 As such, the common law in the United States has slowly
started to develop regarding the legality of posthumous retrieval of gametes.
Case law started to develop after a California state court found that postmortem
conception was not against public policy. 70 Recently, state courts have begun to
analyze posthumous gamete retrieval using the UAGA and have authorized
hospitals to perform the procedure. 71
A.

Hecht v. Superior Court: The Seminal Case

While not directly related to posthumous gamete retrieval, Hecht is an
important case in the analysis of posthumous reproduction. The case in Hecht
arose when Deborah Hecht brought a petition before a California state court
seeking to take possession of fifteen vials of her deceased boyfriend’s sperm
which were stored in a California sperm bank. 72 William Kane deposited his
sperm in the sperm bank less than a month prior to taking his own life, and he
instructed in his will that Hecht should take possession of the sperm and do with
it whatever she wished. 73 When depositing the sperm, Kane signed an
“Authorization to Release Specimens” form, which authorized the sperm bank
to release Kane’s sperm to either Hecht or Hecht’s physician. 74 In his will, Kane
acknowledged that it was his “intention that samples of [his] sperm will be stored
at a sperm bank for the use of [Hecht], should she so desire.” 75 Further, Kane
provided notice that he wished for some of his personal mementoes to be given
to Kane and Hecht’s future children. 76
68. In fact, courts in many jurisdictions traditionally give professional medical standards
conclusive weight in determining the standard of care in a given medical malpractice claim. BARRY
R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 218 (8th ed. 2018).
69. Joseph, supra note 13.
70. Williams, supra note 23, at 185–86. See also Hecht v. Sup. Ct., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 290–
91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
71. In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d 775, 780 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019). See also Joseph, supra note 13.
72. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278.
73. Id. at 276–77.
74. Id. at 276.
75. Id. at 277.
76. Id.
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Hecht’s petition was challenged by Kane’s two children from a previous
marriage, who argued that by granting the petition: (1) children might be born
who will never know their father and “never ever have the slightest hope of being
raised in a traditional family”; (2) Kane’s family would undergo additional
emotional, psychological, and financial stress; and (3) public policy would be
violated through the artificial insemination of an unmarried woman with the
sperm of a deceased man. 77 Kane’s children sought an order for their father’s
sperm to be destroyed. 78
The California court made two major findings pertinent to the development
of assisted reproductive technologies in the law. First, the court held that Kane
possessed an ownership interest in, and decision-making authority over, his
stored sperm. 79 In doing so, the court distinguished Hecht’s case from Moore v.
Regents of University of California, which held that individuals do not have a
possessory interest in bodily materials after they leave the body. 80 Hecht held
that Kane had an ownership interest in his sperm to the extent that he had
decision-making authority as to its use, which was sufficient to constitute
“property” under probate law. 81 This holding is important for posthumous
gamete retrieval because it implies that individuals who exercise their decisionmaking authority over their genetic material have the legal right to decide who
may possess it and for what purpose it may be used.
Second, Hecht held that posthumous conception (the use of a decedent’s
sperm to conceive a child) is not against public policy. 82 Kane’s children argued
that the “‘court should adopt a state policy against posthumous conception’
because it is ‘in truth, the creation of orphaned children by artificial means with
state authorization.’” 83 However, the court rejected their argument: “[A]ssuming
that both Hecht and decedent desired to conceive a child using decedent’s sperm,
[Kane’s children] fail to establish a state interest sufficient to justify interference
with that decision.” 84 The court noted that California lacked a statute which
provided a state interest for interfering on “gamete-providers’ decisional
authority.” 85 This holding allows for other state courts to find that posthumous
conception is not against public policy, thereby opening the door for the
permissibility of posthumous retrieval.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279, 284.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 281.
Id. at 280–281. See also Moore v. Regents Univ. Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488–89 (Cal. 1990).
Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 289.
Id.
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Posthumous Gamete Retrieval and the UAGA: Christy and Zhu

The legality of posthumous gamete retrieval was expanded even further after
an Iowa state court ruled that a hospital may posthumously retrieve the sperm of
a deceased patient, even if that patient has not given express consent. 86 The court
in In re Daniel Thomas Christy held that the term “anatomical gift” under the
UAGA also applied to sperm. 87
Daniel Christy was twenty-three years old when he suffered severe head
trauma due to a motorcycle accident. 88 Once it was likely Christy was braindead, his parents asked the hospital to retrieve his sperm for Christy’s fiancee,
Amy Kruse, to use. 89 The hospital refused to grant the request unless Christy’s
parents could obtain a court order. 90 After Christy’s parents filed an emergency
court order, Sheldon Kurtz, the principal drafter of the 2006 version of the
UAGA, filed an affidavit in support of the use of the UAGA to retrieve Christy’s
sperm for Kruse’s use. 91 Kurtz argued that “[h]arvesting Mr. Christy’s semen
with the intention to direct donation to his fiancée is legally permissible under
the Iowa act” and that this situation was contemplated by the UAGA drafters. 92
The Iowa state court agreed with Christy’s parents and Kruse and ordered that
Christy’s sperm be retrieved. 93
Christy held that “under the [UAGA], an anatomical gift, including the gift
of sperm, can be made by the donor, or, if the donor did not refuse to make the
gift, by the donor’s parents following the donor’s death.” 94 In so ordering, the
Iowa court took the permissibility of posthumous gamete retrieval a step further
than that recommended by the ASRM. While the ASRM encourages providers
to permit posthumous gamete retrieval only when the donor has a written
directive assenting to the procedure, Christy permits the procedure without any
consent made by the donor. 95 In fact, as demonstrated by the Christy opinion,
retrieval and donation are allowed so long as the donor did not expressly refuse
to make the gift. 96 This ruling has the potential to open the door to many people
providing “consent” on behalf of the donor.

86. Simana, supra note 31, at 334.
87. Id.
88. Spielman, supra note 12, at 332.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Spielman, supra note 12, at 332.
94. Id.
95. Ethics Comm. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 11, at 45; Spielman, supra note
12, at 332.
96. Spielman, supra note 12, at 333.
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The Zhu case relied on Christy and the UAGA to infer Peter Zhu’s consent
to the posthumous sperm retrieval procedure through the request of his parents. 97
Zhu was twenty-one years old when he suffered a skiing accident and was
airlifted to a hospital. 98 Zhu was declared dead by neurological criteria, but his
organs were kept viable for transplantation because he was a registered organ
donor. 99 On the morning of the scheduled organ donation, Zhu’s parents brought
a petition to a New York state court asking for an order requiring the hospital to
retrieve Zhu’s sperm and for his parents to decide how it would be used. 100 The
Westchester County Medical Center stated that it neither objected nor consented
to performing the procedure and that it would comply with whatever order the
court instructed. 101 After the court granted an emergency order instructing the
Medical Center to retrieve Zhu’s sperm, the court held a hearing on the ultimate
disposition of the sperm. 102
In making its decision, the court focused on Zhu’s intent. 103 Relying on the
rule of law established in Hecht (“that decedent’s estate representative did not
have the right to destroy decedent’s frozen sperm in light of his expressed
written intent that it be stored for possible future use by his longtime
girlfriend”), 104 the court sought to determine whether Zhu expressed consent to
posthumous gamete retrieval. 105 After determining that Zhu left no express
direction as to the posthumous use of his genetic material, the court ruled that
his “presumed intent can be gleaned from certain of his prior actions and
statements, in conjunction with statutes designed to serve as surrogates for a
decedent’s intent.” 106 The court proceeded to evaluate Zhu’s presumed intent
through the testimony of his parents, in conjunction with the New York state
statute modeled after the UAGA. 107
The court first noted that Zhu was a registered organ donor. 108 Zhu’s parents
testified that he signed up to be an organ donor because Zhu “had always been
motivated by a desire to help others.” 109 They bolstered this testimony by citing
Zhu’s decision to enter the military and become a military doctor as evidence of

97. See In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d 775, 778 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019). See also Spielman, supra note
12, at 332.
98. In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d at 776.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 776–77.
103. In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d at 777.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 778.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 778–79.
108. In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d at 778.
109. Id.
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his “generosity of spirit.” 110 The court reasoned that such evidence demonstrated
that although Zhu did not expressly consent to the posthumous use of his genetic
material, the use of his sperm for posthumous reproduction “would not do
violence to his memory . . . but would be consistent with his past conduct and
statements.” 111
Next, the court considered whether it was appropriate for Zhu’s parents to
make the request for posthumous retrieval for future reproductive use. 112 Once
again, the court used Zhu’s past conduct and statements to determine Zhu’s
intent. 113
In seeking to divine Peter’s intent from his past statements and actions, there is
a consistent thread running through his short life: the primacy of family and
family relationships. In what can be discerned from the Petition, testimony, and
documents adduced, one thing is clear: considerations of family—past, present,
and future—were vital to Peter. Devotion to family, revealed in various ways,
direct and subtle, was evident throughout Peter’s young life. 114

Zhu’s parents testified as to Zhu’s dream of having several children and his
responsibility to carry on his family’s legacy. 115 Zhu’s Tactical Officer at West
Point also testified that during mentoring sessions, Zhu shared his desire to have
several children. 116 After taking all the evidence into consideration, the court
held that there was no “better mechanism for determining the ultimate fate of
[Zhu’s] biological legacy than the decision of Peter’s closest kin, his parents.” 117
The court reasoned that its ruling was proper because the New York state
organ donation statutes allowed for the in-depth survey of the decedent’s
intent. 118 Like the UAGA, the New York statute provides a “pecking order of
consent” of individuals close to the decedent who may provide consent for the
organ donation when the decedent has failed to leave specific instructions as to
whether he or she is for or against the donation of his or her organs. 119 Because
Zhu did not have a health care proxy, a living will, a spouse, or any children, the
first available individuals in that pecking order were his parents. 120 Thus, even
if Zhu was not a registered organ donor, under the UAGA and the New York
state organ donation statute, his parents could have effectuated his organ
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d at 778.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 778–79.
117. Id. at 779.
118. See In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d at 779.
119. Id. See also REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 9 (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON
UNIF. STATE LS. 2009).
120. See In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d at 780.
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donation. 121 Finally, the court found male gametes to be considered “tissue”
under the organ donation statute; thus, the statute applied to the posthumous
retrieval of Zhu’s sperm. 122 In so ruling, the court relied on Christy, noting that
the Iowa court authorized the recovery of the decedent’s sperm by his parents
and permitted them to make an “anatomical gift” to the decedent’s fiancee. 123
Zhu and Christy pushed the boundaries of posthumous gamete retrieval. The
cases permit posthumous retrieval and use of the gametes for reproduction to be
effectuated even when the donor does not expressly consent to the procedure.
Further, the cases allow for the donor’s intent to be presumed, most notably
through the testimony of biased parties. In both cases, the decedent’s parents
petitioned the court for an order instructing the hospital to perform the
procedure. However, Zhu differs from Christy in that Zhu was not engaged. 124
While Daniel Christy’s parents were able to make an “anatomical gift” to
Christy’s fiancee, Peter Zhu’s parents are left to find a possible surrogate for his
sperm. 125 This only complicates an already problematic situation. After jumping
through the legal hoops of posthumous gamete retrieval, Zhu’s parents are now
left to consider the legal nature of surrogacy in the United States if they intend
to use Zhu’s genetic material for reproduction. While the New York court placed
no restrictions on the Zhus’ use of their son’s genetic material, they are likely to
run into other legal and ethical problems. 126
C. Future Development: Robertson
Even after Christy and Zhu, courts continue to rule inconsistently when
deciding cases of posthumous gamete retrieval. In 2018, a California state court
dismissed a complaint against a sperm bank, holding that “it would violate
public policy to make a ruling which would in any way encourage ‘the taking or
harvesting of tissue or organs from someone who has not consented thereto.’” 127
That case, Robertson v. Saadat, involved the alleged misuse of stored sperm by
a sperm bank after the sperm was posthumously retrieved from Aaron Robertson
while he was in a coma with no chance of recovering. 128
Aaron and his wife, Sarah, had always planned on having children together
but were forced to wait until medical technology advanced to a point to
effectively eliminate the chances of Aaron passing on his condition of Marfan

121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Joseph, supra note 13.
126. See In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d at 781.
127. Brief for Appellant at *9, Robertson v. Saadat, 48 Cal. App. 5th 630 (2020) (No.
B292448).
128. Id. at *13, *17.
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Syndrome to their children. 129 However, Aaron suffered a stroke and fell into a
coma before he and Sarah could take steps to have children. 130 Once Sarah
learned that Aaron’s condition was terminal, she requested that the UCLA
Medical Center retrieve reproductive gametes from Aaron so that she could
fulfill their dream of having children. 131 The Medical Center agreed, performed
the procedure, and handed the retrieved sperm over to a sperm bank for
storage. 132 In her complaint, Sarah alleged that the sperm bank lost, destroyed,
or misappropriated Aaron’s donation. 133 The California court dismissed Sarah’s
complaint, reasoning, among other arguments, that Aaron did not consent to the
withdrawal of his sperm and its use after his death, so the court should not make
a ruling which encourages Sarah to recover based on her inability to utilize
“illegally” obtained tissue. 134 In finding Aaron’s sperm “illegally” obtained,
“[t]he court defined an ‘illegally’ obtained organ or tissue as one ‘taken without
the donor’s consent or otherwise specifically permitted by law.’” 135
Sarah appealed the decision to the California Court of Appeals, 136 making
several arguments, two of which are important for this Article. 137 Sarah first
argued that the UAGA permits the spouse of the decedent to make an anatomical
gift of the decedent’s body for the purpose of transplantation. 138 While
“conception” is not defined under the UAGA, Sarah argued that conception
reasonably can be considered “transplantation.” 139 Further, Sarah argued that
sperm is a human tissue, thus falling under the parts of the human body that may
be given as an anatomical gift. 140 Second, Sarah argued that it is not the role of
the court system to decide whether posthumous retrieval is contrary to public
policy because that responsibility lies with the state legislature: 141
Given the questions surrounding sperm extraction, this is a decision best left to
the Legislature to decide if and how to regulate [posthumous sperm retrieval].

129. Id. at *12–13.
130. Id. at *13.
131. Id.
132. Brief for Appellant, supra note 127, at *14–15.
133. Id. at *17.
134. Id. at *9.
135. Id.
136. Between drafting this Article and its publishing, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision,
and the Supreme Court denied review. 2nd Appellate District Docket, CAL. CTS. - APP. CT. CASE
INFO., https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=2&doc_id=2262197&
doc_no=B292448&request_token=NiIwLSEmXkw9WyBRSCMtWE1IIEw6USxTKiI%2BVz5R
MCAgCg%3D%3D (last updated Sept. 24, 2020).
137. Brief for Appellant, supra note 127, at *43, *46.
138. Id. at *43.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at *47.
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Until then, because the Legislature has chosen not to enact any laws prohibiting
the act of sperm extraction, the trial court’s order is contrary to existing law. 142

Robertson is an important case to analyze because it demonstrates the
variation in the common law regarding posthumous gamete retrieval. Not only
may the common law differ from state to state, but it may differ within a state as
well, as demonstrated by Robertson and Hecht. The variance of the common law
across the United States calls for a uniform law on posthumous gamete retrieval.
D. Growth of Posthumous Retrieval
Adopted in 2006 and amended in 2009, the UAGA was drafted and
published by the NCCUSL for passage by all fifty state legislatures. 143 The
NCCUSL drafted the original UAGA in part to address “the critical organ
shortage by providing additional ways for making organ, eye, and tissue
donations.” 144 After the original UAGA was promulgated in 1968, all fifty states
promptly enacted the statute. 145 However, after multiple revisions of the UAGA
and many states adopting non-uniform amendments to their statutes, anatomical
gift acts around the United States were no longer uniform and harmonious,
prompting the NCCUSL to create a new uniform statute. 146 Since the latest
version of the UAGA was published in 2006, forty-six states have adopted it,
once more producing near-uniform anatomical gift act laws around the United
States. 147 Included in the major revisions for the 2006 UAGA is that the Act
“[h]onors the choice of an individual to be or not to be a donor” and “[f]acilitates
donations from a deceased individual who made no lifetime choice by adding to
the list of persons who can make a gift of the deceased individual’s body or
parts.” 148
As relevant background, the UAGA defines anatomical gift as “a donation
of all or part of a human body to take effect after the donor’s death for the
purpose of transplantation, therapy, research, or education.” 149 Part of a human
body is defined as “an organ, an eye, or tissue of a human being.” 150 Under the
UAGA, tissue “means a portion of the human body other than an organ or an
142. Brief for Appellant, supra note 127, at *49.
143. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory n. (amended 2009) (NAT’L CONF.
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LS. 2009).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Anatomical Gift Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/com
munity-home?communitykey=015e18ad-4806-4dff-b011-8e1ebc0d1d0f&tab=groupdetails (last
visited Jan. 15, 2019).
148. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT prefatory n. (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LS. 2009).
149. Id. § 2(3).
150. Id. § 2(18).
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eye.” 151 Of note, the comments to the UAGA state that “part” is intended to
include all parts of the human body, including bones and fluids. 152 Thus, because
sperm is considered tissue, it falls under the definition of “part.” 153
The UAGA provides a method for an individual to refuse to make an
anatomical gift of his or her body or part 154 and preclude another person from
making or revoking the donor’s decision to refuse or make a donation. 155
However, in the absence of any express decision to make or refuse to make a
donation by the donor, the UAGA provides a list of persons who may make a
gift of the donor’s body or part on behalf of the donor. 156 The UAGA states that
an anatomical gift of the donor’s body or part may be made by any member of
the following classes of persons, in the order of priority listed: “(1) an agent of
the decedent . . . ; (2) the spouse of the decedent; (3) adult children of the
decedent; (4) parents of the decedent . . . .” 157 The court in Zhu looked to this
provision of the New York State anatomical gift statute to hold that Zhu’s
parents were considered a proper party to decide the use of Zhu’s gametes. 158
Therefore, without express consent to or refusal of the anatomical gift donation,
the UAGA provides an expansive list of family members who may provide
consent for the decedent.
IV. ANALYSIS
Throughout the United States, hospital policies and state common law have
created great variation in posthumous gamete retrieval procedures. In order to
protect the true interest of the deceased and to keep the proposed law consistent
with cases like Christy and other laws surrounding posthumous retrieval of
human tissue and organ, the NCCUSL should amend the UAGA to explicitly
include posthumous gamete retrieval.
This Article argues that the most ideal posthumous gamete retrieval law is
one that requires the deceased donor to give express consent to both the
procedure and the use of their gametes for later reproduction. Human gametes
are already covered by the UAGA because they are human tissue and as such,
posthumous gamete retrieval should be governed under the UAGA because it is
a kind of anatomical gift. The great variance in law created by health care
systems and state trial courts across the country requires such a uniform law to
protect the interests of the decedent. Special ethical concerns of posthumous
gamete retrieval should further require the donor to expressly grant consent to
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. § 2(30).
Id. § 2 cmt.
REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2 cmt.
Id. § 7.
Id. § 8.
Id. § 9.
Id.
In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d 775, 779 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019).
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the procedure, thus differentiating it from other anatomical gifts under the
UAGA. These considerations require an amendment to the UAGA that explicitly
permits posthumous gamete retrieval only with the express consent of the
deceased.
A.

Gametes Are Tissue and Are Governed by the UAGA

The Harvard Medical Dictionary defines tissue as “[a] group of cells that are
specialized to do a certain job and are joined together to form a body
structure.” 159 Gametes are defined as “a mature male or female germ cell usually
possessing a haploid chromosome set and capable of initiative formation of a
new diploid individual by fusion with a gamete of the opposite sex.” 160 . Because
both male and female gametes are a group of cells that are specialized to do a
certain job, reproduction, 161 gametes should rightly be considered human tissue.
The NCCUSL already recognizes male sperm as tissue. When defining what
human body parts may be given as an anatomical gift, the writers of the UAGA
noted that “part” includes tissue; thus sperm, classified as a tissue, is considered
a part under the UAGA. 162 It is a safe assumption that the drafters of the UAGA
would also consider female eggs to fall under the UAGA because they too are
tissue. Because both sperm and eggs are tissue, they are considered a “part”
under the UAGA, meaning that they can be donated as an anatomical gift for the
purpose of “transplantation, therapy, research, or education.” 163
The question remains whether posthumous gamete retrieval for the purpose
of future reproduction can be considered an anatomical gift because it meets one
of the four purposes defined in the UAGA. The expressed purposes of an
anatomical gift under the UAGA are “transplantation, therapy, research, or
education.” 164 Retrieval of gametes for reproduction is clearly not for the
purpose of therapy, research, or education. Thus, posthumous gamete retrieval
is only governed by the UAGA if it is done for the purpose of transplantation.
Transplantation is the “process of removing an organ or other donated body
part from one person and implanting it in another person.” 165 Although
conception is not the same process as the transplantation of an organ, it
reasonably falls under the definition of transplantation, as demonstrated by the

159. Medical Dictionary of Health Terms: Q-Z, HARV. MED. SCH. (Dec. 2011),
https://www.health.harvard.edu/q-through-z.
160. Gamete, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gamete
(last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
161. Gamete, SCITABLE, https://www.nature.com/scitable/definition/gamete-gametes-311/
(last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
162. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2 cmt.
163. Id. § 2(3).
164. Id.
165. HARV. MED. SCH., supra note 159.
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plaintiff’s argument in Robertson. 166 The use of retrieved gametes for
conception involves removing a donated body part (gametes are a body part that
may be donated) from one person and “implanting” it in another person. 167
While conception does not “implant” the gametes like one may “implant” a
removed organ into another individual, it does include implantation in another
form. Take, for example, a kidney donation versus gametes used for in vitro
fertilization. While the kidney is implanted with the goal of becoming an
intrinsic part of the donee’s body for their lifetime, the goal of gametic
implantation through in vitro fertilization is reproduction. In this way, the
implantation of gametes is not intended to become a part of the donee’s body
forever but rather to produce a new life.
Some legal scholars are not convinced that conception falls under one of the
four purposes outlined by the UAGA. While discussing the philosophical and
ethical concerns of posthumous conception, Anne Schiff argued that the UAGA
does not apply to posthumous reproduction. 168 Schiff reasoned that
[a]lthough the UAGA’s definition of human body ‘parts’ that can be donated is
broad enough to include sperm and eggs, the Act does not apply to posthumous
procreation since the stated purposes for donation are for ‘transplantation,
therapy, medical or dental education, research, or advancement of medical or
dental science.’ 169

Other scholars who agree with Schiff’s conclusion argue that the UAGA
should be amended to expressly include posthumous conception. 170
However, when examining the facts in Christy, the Iowa state court found
that Christy’s situation could be analyzed under the UAGA. 171 The court’s
opinion “did not explicitly attend to the reproductive potential of gametes, either
by stating that conception fell under the purposes of UAGA, or by stating that
the purposes of UAGA were not of central importance and could be
overlooked.” 172 In doing so, the court implied that conception fell under the
purposes of the UAGA. 173 Additionally, although the court in Zhu analyzed
Zhu’s case under the New York State anatomical gift statute, 174 the court did not
166. Brief for Appellant, supra note 127, at *43.
167. G. Bahadur, Death and Conception, 17 HUM. REPROD. 2769, 2772 (2002).
168. Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation,
75 N.C. L. REV. 901, 928 (1997).
169. Id.
170. See Susan Kerr, Post-Mortem Sperm Procurement: Is It Legal?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 39, 64–65 (1999).
171. Spielman, supra note 12, at 333.
172. Id. at 333–34.
173. Id. at 334.
174. Although New York has not officially adopted the 2006 UAGA, the statute provision on
which Zhu relied is modeled after Section 9 of the UAGA. See In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d 775, 779–
80 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019).
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explicitly consider the purposes of the UAGA or the State statute. 175 Whether or
not “conception” is an expressed or implied purpose of the UAGA, Christy and
Zhu demonstrate that courts are using the UAGA to decide cases of posthumous
gamete retrieval and use for future reproduction. Therefore, posthumous gamete
retrieval for use in future reproduction should be considered an anatomical gift
and, as such, is already governed by the UAGA.
B.

Laws Surrounding Posthumous Gamete Retrieval Should be Uniform

Beyond adoption of the UAGA, federal and state legislatures have failed to
enact any statutes pertaining to posthumous gamete retrieval. 176 As such, health
care providers and health care systems have relied on ethics opinions and model
legislation in order to determine how to respond to a request for posthumous
gamete retrieval. 177 However, even though organizations such as the ASRM
have called for health care systems to adopt policies regarding posthumous
gamete retrieval, most health care systems across the United States have failed
to do so. 178 Further, of the few health care systems that have adopted a policy,
the policies themselves vary greatly. 179 While some health care systems
establish conditions that must be in place before undergoing the procedure,
others simply prohibit the procedure outright. 180
In other words, the system of law surrounding posthumous gamete retrieval
has been developed by individuals working in the health care system, not elected
lawmakers. As such, the system that has developed is confusing, inconsistent,
and leaves little room for oversight or guidance. 181 While ethics opinions are
helpful to guide providers, providers are by no means required to follow the
advice given by the writer of the opinion. 182 It is very possible for health care
systems within the same state, or even the same city, to have drastically different
policies on posthumous gamete retrieval. Further, it is even possible for
providers within the same hospital to have different policies. The ASRM notes
that “it is reasonable to conclude that physicians are not ethically obligated to
comply with [a request for posthumous retrieval of gametes or a request for their
175. Id.
176. Fruchtman, supra note 7.
177. Id.
178. Waler et al., supra note 15, at 45.
179. Id. at 48.
180. Id. Even with an amendment to the UAGA, there is a risk that different hospitals, health
care systems, and even states will still have varying requirements to undergo a procedure for
posthumous gamete retrieval. While not governed by a uniform act, a good comparison is to
abortion procedures in the United States. Like abortion, people seeking the procedure may be forced
to travel to a different state if they do not meet the procedure requirements in their home state. See
generally Christina A. Cassidy, Women Seek Abortions Out of State Amid Restrictions, AP NEWS
(Sept. 8, 2019), https://apnews.com/4ced42150e3348328296e28559c2143b.
181. Waler et al., supra note 15.
182. Id. at 49.
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future use for reproduction].” 183 This means that a spouse’s request for the
retrieval of gametes may be approved or denied simply based on which
physicians are working that day, provided that the patient is seeking the
procedure in a hospital. 184
This is a troubling concern when dealing with a time-sensitive and emotional
procedure like posthumous gamete retrieval. As many requests may be made
when the donor is near death or already dead, the gametes need to be retrieved
in a timely manner in order to keep them viable. 185 So too, the person making
the request may be grieving, which could further complicate matters when the
policy for the procedure is decided by a group of health care workers. To make
health care system policies across the country uniform and to streamline the
process for making a request, the United States should enact a law regulating the
practice of posthumous gamete retrieval. The best way to do this would be to
amend the UAGA to explicitly cover posthumous gamete retrieval and to outline
the additional requirements for a permitted procedure.
C. Requests for Posthumous Gamete Retrieval Should Include the Donor’s
Explicit Consent
The UAGA should be amended to explicitly permit posthumous gamete
retrieval. While it is possible that posthumous retrieval and use for future
reproduction falls under the purpose of “transplantation,” the drafters of the
UAGA should amend the Act to clarify. The definition for “anatomical gift”
should be amended to incorporate the notion that an anatomical gift may be
made for the purpose of reproduction. Further, the existing comments to the
definition of “part” state that male sperm is considered tissue, 186 but the
comments should be clarified to explicitly include female eggs. By such
amendments posthumous gamete retrieval will be explicitly permitted under the
UAGA.
However, further amendments to the Act are needed to avoid many ethical
problems. First, without any additional changes to the UAGA, any person who
registers as an organ donor would be in a position to give their gametes as an
183. Ethics Comm. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 11, at 4.
184. While it is very possible that posthumous gamete retrieval procedures are taking place in
various doctor’s offices across the US, this Article focuses on procedures done at the institutional
level because various physicians in the private setting may decide to perform the procedure on their
own terms. See Simana, supra note 31 (noting that decisions regarding posthumous gamete retrieval
are made at private fertility clinics). Requests for the procedure are also on the rise in emergency
departments. See Andrew R. Zinkel et al., Postmortem Sperm Retrieval in the Emergency
Department: A Case Report and Review of Available Guidelines, 3 CLINICAL PRAC. & CASES
EMERGENCY MED. 405, 406 (2019).
185. Simana, supra note 31, at 332.
186. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2 cmt. (NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LS. 2009).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

204

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 14:183

anatomical gift, likely to someone with whom the donor never consented to
producing children. 187 To avoid this, every person who registers as an organ
donor yet does not wish to give their gametes as an anatomical gift would need
to sign a refusal to donate their gametes. 188 This extra step may go against the
ultimate purpose of the UAGA, which is to make organ and tissue donation laws
uniform and make the entire organ donation process easier. 189 So too, under
Section 9 of the UAGA, if a decedent fails to either consent to organ donation
or expressly refuse organ donation, a pecking order of individuals will have the
right to make an anatomical gift of the decedent’s gametes on their behalf. 190
This is the Section that Zhu relied on in determining that Peter’s parents were
the proper party to retrieve Peter’s gametes and decide on their future use. 191 By
allowing Peter’s parents to retrieve and hold Peter’s gametes for future use, the
Zhu court went a step too far in analyzing posthumous gamete retrieval under
the UAGA.
Who then is a proper party to receive a decedent’s gametes? Because of the
ethical considerations of donating one’s gametes posthumously, the donor must
evaluate whether he or she wishes for the receiver of the gametes to raise a child
after his or her death. In this way, the donation of gametes is vastly different
from the donation of an organ or other bodily tissue. The donation of gametes
will likely bring about offspring, and that offspring will be the child of the donor.
Thus, in order to protect the true interests of the donor, any law or policy
regulating posthumous gamete retrieval must require the donor to expressly
approve of the person who is to be the recipient.
In order to properly give consent, the donor must realize that consent to
undergo a procedure for posthumous gamete retrieval is twofold. An individual
with a desire to have his or her gametes retrieved posthumously is not just
consenting to the procedure. The individual is also consenting to the use of those
gametes by another person for future reproduction. 192 Thus, to truly consent to
posthumous gamete retrieval, the decedent must consider the future disposition
of his or her gametes and evaluate the person to whom they wish to gift their
gametes. Not only must the decedent affirm that he or she has chosen a person
to have children with, but the decedent must confirm that he or she intends to
allow this person to raise the children, knowing that he or she will be deceased.

187. Id. § 11 cmt.
188. See id. § 7 cmt.
189. This is due to the fact that the UAGA imposes an “opt in” principle, meaning that anyone
who wishes to be an organ donor must register as one. Id. prefatory n. This is contrary to many
European countries, where all citizens are deemed organ donors unless the individual chooses to
opt out. Id.
190. REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 9.
191. See In re Zhu, 103 N.Y.S.3d 775, 285–86 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019).
192. Id. at 288.
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Therefore, the donation of gametes should be limited to the decedent’s
spouse, fiance, or partner. Further, when expressly consenting to the procedure,
the donor should also expressly consent to the donation of their gametes to their
spouse or fiance. In this way, the donor’s true interests can be reflected in the
donation of their gametes and the donor can fully evaluate the consequences of
donating their gametes.
By allowing Peter’s parents to make up the disposition of his gametes after
his death, the Zhu court ignored the true interests of the decedent. The court
relied on the fact that Peter had a “dream of having several children, and the
responsibility he felt to carry on his cultural and family legacy” in determining
that Peter would have wanted his gametes retrieved and used posthumously. 193
As evidence of this, the court examined a letter Peter sent to a former professor
telling the professor that “[y]ou are the type of teacher who I will share with my
children” and a conversation with a military mentor, in which Peter expressed
the desire to get married and have children. 194 While it is clear that Peter had a
desire to have children and his own family, it will never be known whether Peter
wanted his parents to take steps to carry out his family legacy if he was unable
to do so. The only evidence of Peter’s desire came from testimony and other
evidence produced by Peter’s parents. 195 However, Peter’s parents were a biased
party in this case. As the only producers of evidence, it is unlikely that a party,
like Peter’s parents, will produce evidence in opposition of their desired
outcome. In other words, because of the position the Zhus were in, by wanting
to retrieve and use Peter’s gametes for future reproduction, the Zhus were
unlikely to produce any evidence of Peter’s intentions to not allow them to carry
on his legacy in his place. In fact, the ASRM calls attention to this conflict of
interest by commenting that oftentimes, the only evidence of the decedent’s
intent comes from biased parties. 196 To prevent such a situation from occurring,
any potential amendment to the UAGA should include the addition of a section
designed specifically for posthumous gamete retrieval.
The most important condition of the posthumous retrieval process which
needs to be governed is the decedent’s consent. In order to avoid problems such
as consenting to gamete retrieval when registering for organ donation or
allowing a long list of individuals to give consent on the decedent’s behalf,
posthumous gamete retrieval should only be permitted with the express consent
of the decedent. Thus, any statute governing posthumous gamete retrieval
should require the decedent’s express consent.
Therefore, to protect the interests of the deceased, any potential statute
governing posthumous gamete retrieval must permit the procedure only when
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 285.
Id.
Id. at 284.
Ethics Comm. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 11, at 4.
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the deceased has given informed consent to both undergoing the procedure and
allowing their gametes to be used for reproduction. The decedent should also
specify the person who is to receive the anatomical gift of their gametes and,
once again, consent to that person using the gametes for reproduction after their
death. Such consent cannot be given by simply registering to be an organ donor
but instead should be outlined in an advanced directive or a will.
V. CONCLUSION
Posthumous gamete retrieval, like other assisted reproductive technologies,
is becoming more common in the United States and other countries. However,
the United States lacks statutes or regulations on the federal and state level
regulating the practice. As such, health care systems and state trial courts have
been left to their own devices to develop policy guidelines. Some state trial
courts have begun to analyze the practice of posthumous retrieval under their
state’s Anatomical Gift Act.
In order to create a uniform system of laws in an emotional area of medicine
designed to create life, the NCCUSL should amend the UAGA to explicitly
permit posthumous gamete retrieval. In doing so, the new amendment should
only permit posthumous retrieval when the donor provides express consent and
specifies the person who is to receive the anatomical gift. Through this, the true
interests of the deceased can be carried out, and courts will not have to rely on
testimony and evidence from biased parties.
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